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[Summary] Political communication comes in various forms. The first part of this paper 
presents some variants of political communication, and provides a set of definitions of such 
communication. A centre of gravity is along the borderline and overlap between rhetoric and 
propaganda. It is argued here that rhetoric unlike propaganda has a potential for deliberation. 
Propaganda is inherently hostile towards debate and discussion. This reluctance towards 
debate and discussion has at times been evident as regards the Bush administration’s war on 
terrorism. The second part of the article deals with propaganda from the Bush administration 
aimed at quelling debate. All the principals from the first George W. Bush administration 
(2001-2005) took part in this strategy. Most of the material presented here is explained in 
more detail in Anders G. Romarheim  (2005). “Crossfire of Fear: Propaganda in the US 
War on Terrorism” Hovedoppgave i Statsvitenskap, ISV, UIO. 
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Definitions of strategic 
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Definitions of strategic political communication  
 
This article presents definitions of strategic political 
communication. One centre of gravity for such discussions 
concerns the borderline – and overlap – between rhetoric and 
propaganda. What is propaganda, what is rhetoric, and how 
should they be defined? These two variants of communication 
are in many instances very difficult to separate; there is a grey 
zone between them. Nevertheless, as Dr. Johnson eloquently 
pointed out: ‘The fact that day shades into night via twilight does 
not mean that we cannot distinguish between day and night’ 
(quoted in Brown 2004:53). 
That ‘propaganda’ is a disputed and controversial term 
makes it even more important to work with it, and to strive for 
greater consensus about its content and core. After the Second 
World War, propaganda has been largely used in a derogative 
way in everyday language. This is somewhat undeserved: 
propaganda can serve good ends as much as bad ends. 
Propaganda need not be as bad as its current reputation. 
Those sceptical to any kind of propaganda should recall 
that it was widely employed by both sides in the world wars of 
the 20th century, and it played a crucial role in curbing 
international Communism during the Cold War. If a nation 
wants to succeed in war, it would be negligent and precarious not 
to make use of propaganda. ‘War predetermines the use of 
propaganda’ (Page 1996:41).  
When a term is plagued by negative connotations and 
associations, alternative synonyms or euphemisms will normally 
emerge. We will start out with some observations regarding 
strategic communication, before moving on to define rhetoric, 
propaganda and other variants of strategic political 
communication. In the second part of this article, some of the 
theoretical tenets will be tested on empirical material – more 
precisely, the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. Three 
communication strategies adopted by the George W. Bush 
administration will be presented.  
It will be argued that the strategies are best defined as 
propaganda strategies aimed at generating public support for the 
war on terrorism. The propaganda strategies of the Bush 
administration sought to establish a link between the war in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and to spread the perception that Iraq possessed 
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a considerable stock of weapons of mass destruction. 
Furthermore, there was strategic communication designed to 
choke opposition and terminate any critical discussions about the 
war on terrorism. 
Political communication and persuasion of the masses 
 
Politics is a multifaceted phenomenon that involves a quest for 
power and influence. It is also a decision-making process that 
determines the distribution of social goods and establishes laws, 
rights and prohibitions. This holds true whether decisions are 
made by an arbitrary dictator or by a representative body of 
elected delegates. For a better understanding of politics in 
society, we need to understand communication in its various 
forms. Politics without communication is like having blood 
without veins and arteries: it’s not really going anywhere. 
Aristotle’s notion of communication and language has 
remained a cornerstone of communication theory. Throughout 
the ages, it has been relentlessly and vigorously attacked from 
many quarters – without ever disappearing from sight. Figure I 
presents an example of an Aristotelian model of communication:  
 
Figure I: 
 
Speaker           Arguments        Speech        Audience 
 
One limitation of this model is that it depicts 
communication as a one-way process. That is an interesting 
feature, precisely because propaganda is often described as one-
directional communication – but a fruitful definition of 
communication must include two-way communication as well. A 
more modern conception of communication derives from George 
Gerbner: communication is social interaction through messages 
(quoted in McQuail 1994:10). Such an approach is sufficiently 
broad for the purposes of this article, and includes non-verbal 
action and inaction as means of communicating something. 
Narrowing down the scope from communication in 
general, to focus instead on mass communication, we find 
certain mechanisms at work. McQuail (1994:38) has argued that 
the following features are present in the mass communication 
process: ‘large scale, one-directional flow, asymmetrical, 
impersonal and anonymous, calculative relationship and 
standardized content’ A communicator who targets a mass 
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audience does so in a calculative – and potentially manipulative 
– manner. The mass audience has been defined in 
communication studies as a passive object of manipulation. ‘It 
[the mass] did not act for itself but was, rather, acted upon’ 
(ibid).  
Furthermore, the content of mass communication is 
considered to be standardized. One main reason for this is that 
access to mass media, and opportunities for shaping its content, 
are to a great extent granted only to an elite of professional 
communicators. Journalists, politicians, media producers and 
advertisers tend to reproduce procedures and practices, and they 
follow certain codes of conduct when ‘producing’ mass 
communication. This resembles the habitual pattern that 
characterizes bureaucracies known as ‘Standard Operating 
Procedures’ (SOP). A media channel will cultivate its own 
particular conventions and practices. One reason for establishing 
a distinct media-channel culture is to make it easily recognizable 
and thus capable of acquiring loyal audiences. 
Mass communication is quite often also persuasive 
communication. McGuire’s information-processing theory, 
introduced in 1968, provides a lucid presentation of how 
persuasive communication works. The theory operates with six 
steps:   
 
1.The persuasive message must be communicated.  
2.The receiver will attend to the message.  
3.The receiver will comprehend the message.  
4.The receiver yields to and is convinced by the arguments presented.  
5.The newly adopted position is retained.  
6. The desired behaviour takes place.   
(from Severin & Tankard 2001:174). 
 
Only one critical question will be raised to McGuire’s 
theory. Regarding step 4, why is the word ‘convinced’ used 
instead of ‘persuaded’? Surely, persuasive communication 
should have persuasion as its goal. ‘Convinced’ and ‘persuaded’ 
are fairly close in meaning, but there is a nuance here that is 
worthy of recognition. A dictionary definition of the verb ‘to 
convince’ is: ‘to make someone completely certain about 
something’ (Longmans 1992:280). If one is persuaded on the 
other hand, there may still be an ounce of reluctance or doubt, 
but despite that, the persuadee succumbs to the pressure of the 
persuader. A persuaded person may perform externally the same 
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actions as a convinced person, but his inner sentiments need not 
be congruent with his observable behaviour.  
Now to the effects of mass communication; how does the 
public relate to political mass communication such as news? It is 
obvious that commercial news outlets strive to fine-tune their 
news in accordance with the (presumed) intellectual level of 
their primary audiences. News that is too difficult – or too simple 
– for the regular audience to interpret may result in plummeting 
ratings for news outlets. ‘The public will accept news if it is 
arranged in a comprehensible system’ (Ellul 1973:250). 
Schema theory examines the processes that lead up to an 
interpretation of ‘new’– or ostensibly new – information, and 
how this new interpretation is affected by old information in the 
mind of the individual. The starting point of Graber’s Processing 
the News (1993) is that ‘Americans are confronted by a 
seemingly unmanageable flood tide of information’ (Graber 
1993:1). As a result ‘people pay attention to only a small amount 
of the available information’ (Ibid: 2).  
Schema theory suggests that the information overload 
forces the individual to simplify and categorize new information 
on the basis of already existing knowledge stored in ‘schemata’. 
‘A schemata is a cognitive structure consisting of organized 
knowledge about situations and individuals that has been 
abstracted from prior experiences’ (Graber 1993:28). 
When encountering new political information, the 
individual will begin a process of decoding the message through 
comparison with pre-existing schemata, until one is found that 
matches fairly well. Having found such a schemata, the 
individual transfers some of the knowledge of the already 
existing schemata onto the new information. As a result, little is 
learned that is actually new – even when the individual 
encounters distinctly new scenarios and political information.  
This has at least two implications for political 
communicators, propagandists and journalists. Firstly, they must 
try to present new political information in a format and with a 
structure already somewhat familiar to the audience. Secondly, it 
will be rational to simplify the political mass communication, so 
as to ensure that the most important information gets through to 
the audience. If the communicator does not simplify the 
information, then the individual probably will – and then there is 
no knowing what will be understood and remembered. Telling 
the full story may in fact confuse and distract the audience away 
from the most important parts of the argument or information. 
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Propaganda and rhetoric defined 
 
The term ‘propaganda’ originates from a papal attempt to 
contain the spread of Protestantism and to propagate the Roman 
Catholic faith: the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 
established by Pope Gregory XV in 1622. The word is derived 
from the Latin verb ‘propagare’, which means to spread and 
propagate. For our purposes, we may define propaganda as 
follows, primarily based on Jowett & O’Donnell (1999:6) and 
Ellul (1973:61):  
 
Propaganda is systematic strategic mass communication 
conveyed by an organization to shape perceptions and 
manipulate the cognitions of a specific audience. Its ultimate 
goal is to direct the audience’s behaviour to achieve a response 
that furthers the political objectives of the propaganda 
organization. 
 
One clarification: In propaganda, as here defined, there is 
no invitation to dialogue. ‘[Propaganda] does not tolerate 
discussion; by its very nature, it excludes contradiction and 
discussion’ (Ellul 1973:11). In this respect propaganda differs 
from rhetoric – again, as defined here. The normative definition 
of rhetoric suggested here consists of Aristotle’s (1941:1329) 
centuries-old definition, supplemented with Jowett & 
O’Donnell’s (1999:28) contemporary approach to persuasion:  
 
Rhetoric is the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of persuasion, persuasion being potentially – 
and ideally – the outcome of an interactive communicative 
process. 
 
In rhetoric – when it is defined as a potentially 
deliberative two-way process – relevant and sincere 
argumentation will play a central role. Participants may expect 
that principles of relevance and veracity will be respected 
(Andersson & Furberg 1973:33). This may also be true of 
instances of propaganda. For the propagandist, however, the 
choice of instruments for influencing his target is entirely a 
question of strategy: the propagandist is not interested in an 
interactive process involving mutual influence.  
Theory that aims to separate propaganda from other forms 
of communication tends to focus on one of these three criteria: 
content, technique or asymmetry of interests.  
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Firstly, scholars like Leonard Doob (1948) have 
suggested that the nature of the content of communication 
determines whether we are dealing with propaganda or not. Such 
definitions focus on questions of information/disinformation and 
objective truths, half-truths or deliberate lies. Such content-based 
definitions rest on the presupposition that there exists an 
objective truth regarding most phenomena. One should not 
dismiss the notion of an objective reality, but it is a difficult 
concept to work with. ‘In our time “meaning” and “truth” join 
“reality” as problematic and relative terms’ (Gardner 1980:806).   
Secondly, definitions that focus on technique typically 
state that propaganda has more to do with how things are 
communicated than with the substantial content of what is 
communicated. Propaganda should be understood as a means: it 
can be applied towards ends that may be immoral or moral. 
‘Propaganda as a mere tool is no more moral or immoral than a 
pump handle’ (Lasswell 1995:21). 
Thirdly, there is the criterion of asymmetry of interest 
between persuader and persuadee. It is sometimes claimed that 
we are dealing with propaganda if the desired ends of the 
persuader ‘will be advantageous to the persuader but not in the 
best interest of the persuadee’ (Brown 1958:300). In fact, this 
approach is problematic, as it may be difficult to determine what 
will be in the best interest of the persuadee. Take an example, 
where we assume that govermental “information campaigns” is 
indeed propaganda aimed at directing behaviour. Many people 
enjoy smoking and do not wish to quit, even though they know it 
seriously damages their health. Governmental anti-smoking 
propaganda campaigns aim at an outcome that is ‘in the best 
interest’ of the smoker, the government and society at large. 
This study prefers to see propaganda primarily as a 
technique. It is hard to determine whether someone may benefit 
from being exposed to propaganda or not. Furthermore, 
propaganda need not be untrue. To reduce the definition of 
propaganda to primarily a question of content is therefore 
insufficient, and may ultimately lead to a useless definition of 
propaganda defined as the opposite of proven facts and truth.  
The definition of propaganda put forward here is basically 
an attempt at splicing two influential definitions in the academic 
literature on propaganda. Let us start by examining Jowett & 
O’Donnell’s definition more closely: 
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Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to 
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.  
    (Jowett & O’Donnell 1999:6) 
 
This technique-oriented definition is a useful analytical 
tool. The wording is precise, and largely neutral as to questions 
of morality and content. The first two terms of the definition 
represent important criteria in defining propaganda. It is often 
taken as implicit, but should be stated explicitly, that propaganda 
is systematic and deliberate. This deliberate aspect acknowledges 
propagandists as instrumental and intentional actors. 
Furthermore, Jowett & O’Donnell encapsulate much of 
propaganda activities with the wording ‘shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions’. These processes form the core of their 
definition. ‘Shape’ refers to a milder form of propaganda, 
whereas ‘manipulate’ generally has more negative connotations. 
The crucial point for the propagandist is to disseminate certain 
cognitions and perceptions in order to produce behaviour that the 
propagandist considers desirable.   
Passive behaviour is also a possible goal: the desired 
behaviour towards which propaganda works may be inaction, 
implicitly supporting and maintaining the status quo. It is 
important to note that Jowett & O’Donnell do not exclude the 
possibility that the desired behaviour may from time to time be 
beneficial for the propagandee as well. Asymmetry of interests 
between propagandist and propagandee is very common, but 
should not serve as a definitional criterion 
The minor problems involved in Jowett & O’Donnell’s 
definition stem largely from what is not included. It could be 
argued that the definition is too wide and should include 
additional criteria to decrease the population found in the 
propaganda universe. One definition that can remedy some of 
the shortcomings is that provided by Jacques Ellul (1973: 61): 
 
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized 
group that wants to bring about the active or passive 
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, 
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations 
and incorporated in an organization.  
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The word ‘method’ is used in this definition, indicating 
that Ellul is also placed within the branch of propaganda theory 
that views propaganda as a technique. Additionally, the notion of 
propaganda as a mass phenomenon is conspicuous here. 
According to Ellul, propaganda is initiated by an organized 
group and is directed at a mass of individuals. The aim of 
propaganda is to agitate and inspire people to action and to 
incorporate them in an organization.  
According to Ellul, ‘total propaganda’ must be exercised. 
All available media must be applied to reach the full range of 
individuals in the target group. He further argues that 
propaganda furnishes the individual with a complete system for 
explaining the world (Ellul 1973: 11), and stresses the 
importance of centralized control over the media for propaganda 
to be effective (ibid: 102). This last assumption has now become 
obsolete. 
 ‘Only action is of concern to modern propaganda’ (Ellul 
1973:25).  In this he underestimates the passive and sedating 
effect that propaganda may have. Manipulating cognitions may 
be an effective way for a state to prevent undesirable actions like 
riots or demonstrations, not to mention the ultimate and 
existential threat: coups that can topple the propaganda 
organization. Here it seems more precise to use the word 
‘behaviour’ rather than ‘action’.  
Ellul presents one more idea that deserves mention: the 
concept of propaganda as a substitute for a leader. ‘It means that 
in a group without a leader, but subjected to propaganda, the 
sociological and psychological effects are the same as if there 
were a leader’ (Ellul 1973: 211). If we relate this idea to the 
current frontrunner in the world of international terrorism, the 
pieces fall into place. Al Qaeda cells sometimes operate as if 
there were a leader present, even though they have never met Bin 
Laden or any of his closest lieutenants. That such groups may 
still be inspired and directed by al Qaeda’s propaganda also 
points up an essential truth: that an integral part of defeating 
international terrorism consists in conducting a propaganda 
campaign capable of refuting the propaganda issued by the 
spiritual and ideological leaders of terrorist groups. 
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Propaganda: comparative aspect 
 
Words frequently used as synonyms for propaganda are lies, distortion, deceit, 
manipulation, mind control, psychological warfare, brainwashing and palaver       
(Jowett & O’Donnell 1999:3). 
 
Contrasting propaganda to other terms may increase our 
understanding of it. In the following, propaganda will be seen in 
relation to words like information, education, spin, and the 
concept of public diplomacy. Advertising will not be given much 
attention here, since propaganda, as the term is defined here, is 
not about selling products. Unlike propaganda, advertising has 
economic ends (Ellul 1973:62). Political propaganda has an 
inherent capacity to engage beyond trivial consumerism: it is in 
fact about life and death (Taithe & Thornton 1999:15). 
Jowett & O’Donnell (1999:12) describe propaganda as 
‘white, grey or black, in relationship to an acknowledgment of its 
source and its accuracy of information.’ These two variables for 
making a typology have been in use for some time now; also 
Ellul (1973:15) discusses them, with emphasis on covert and 
overt propaganda. 
‘White’ propaganda comes from a source that is identified 
correctly, and the information in the message tends to be 
factually accurate. Nevertheless, white propaganda messages are 
characterized by biased ‘reasoning’, and are often aimed at 
improving the credibility of the source. Such credibility can be 
used at a later stage when influencing and manipulating may be 
more important than when the white propaganda message was 
conveyed. It is white propaganda that overlaps the most with 
related terms such as public diplomacy, information, rhetoric and 
persuasion. 
‘Black’ propaganda applies stealth and is credited to a 
false source. It spreads lies and fabrications. Black propagandists 
have no concern for the truth: deception is actively sought. 
Moreover, black propagandists will not hesitate to apply any 
techniques to achieve persuasion. Bjørgo & Heradstveit 
(1996:12) have labelled propaganda as ‘persuasion by all – and 
any – means’. This description is particularly apt for black 
propaganda. 
‘Grey’ propaganda is placed in the middle of an imagined 
continuum between black and white propaganda. The correctness 
of the information and the identity of the source may be known 
Definitions of Strategic Political Communication 10 
or unknown. Logically, propaganda will never be ‘black’ if its 
original source can be determined, and if that source 
acknowledges its involvement. No matter how manipulative or 
deceptive a statement is, it should be classified as grey if the 
source can be correctly identified. Similarly, a message may be 
veracious and accurate, but nevertheless grey, because the source 
is unknown. 
Educative processes resemble propagandistic processes to 
some extent. Ellul (1973: xiii) considers propaganda to be ‘semi-
educative’ or ‘re-education’. Propaganda can be used to break 
down or disable prior learning. Some white propaganda may 
overlap with what is normally defined as education – i.e. ‘the 
process by which a person’s mind and character are developed 
through teaching’ (Longmans 1992: 407). One important 
distinction between education and propaganda is explained in the 
following statement: ‘Education teaches us how to think in order 
to enable us to make up our own minds, propaganda dictates 
what one should think’ (Cull et al. 2003: xix). When one dictates 
what others should think – and consequently also how others 
should behave – there is little genuine education involved. It has 
more to do with mind-control to ‘manufacture’ conformity and 
obedience.   
Another interesting word pair is ‘information’ and 
‘disinformation’. Ellul (1973: 112) claims that it is impossible to 
distinguish clearly between propaganda and information. Jowett 
and O’Donnell (1999:18), however, point to the close links 
between disinformation and propaganda. ‘Heavily biased 
selective information’ will often be a fitting description of the 
content of propaganda. Deliberate disinformation is the 
propaganda that is easiest to categorize as such.  
Propaganda often involves exploiting the conventions of 
rhetoric. It has been  argued that: ‘The honest rhetorician has no 
separate name to distinguish him from the dishonest’ (Aristotle 
1941: 1318). Here, rhetoric has been defined as ‘the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion, 
persuasion being potentially – and ideally – the outcome of an 
interactive communicative process.’ 
Rhetoric represents an opportunity for deliberation, and a 
common understanding of a phenomenon is often sought. In 
what constitutes a genuine discussion, all participants must be 
willing to adjust their line of action, if convincing 
counterarguments to their initial position are presented 
(Midgaard et al. 1973: 98–105). In this respect, persuasion and 
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propaganda differ, since the propagandist seeks to direct 
behaviour, irrespective of any counterarguments.  
Rhetoric should be defined so that it excludes dogmatism. 
Dogmatism is about ‘holding one’s beliefs very strongly and 
expecting other people to accept them without question’ 
(Longmans 1992: 375). A constituting condition for listening to 
another person’s arguments is that the person will listen to – and 
give real consideration to – any counterarguments or alternative 
perspectives one might present. The notion of communicative 
rationality and the idea that speakers will yield to the force of 
better arguments relates to this aspect of rhetoric (Habermas 
1984: 25). If this convention – or implicit agreement – is not 
adhered to, then there can be no real debate. If this condition is 
not met, rhetoric – or any form of two-way communication – is 
dysfunctional. It may degenerate into a series of non-related 
monologues, as indeed occasionally happens in partisan political 
debates. 
In contemporary society, the term ‘rhetoric’ often has 
negative connotations not necessarily implied by its original 
meaning (derived from the Greek for ‘orator’ and related to a 
term meaning ‘a word’). As noted by Taithe & Thorton (1993: 
3), many people have lost sight of ‘the real purpose of rhetoric, 
which is to convince and persuade, in effect to end disputes and 
iron out dissent through reasoned argument’. Propaganda, by 
contrast, typically seeks to eliminate dissent without discussion.  
An important distinction between the rhetorician and the 
propagandist is that the latter does not need to espouse the views 
or perceptions he disseminates to the audience: indeed, he may 
be fully aware that they are false. ‘He must, of course, believe in 
the cause he serves, but not in his particular argument’ (Ellul 
1973: 24). What is of real importance to the propagandist is that 
it is in his interest if the perception in question is accepted by the 
propagandee. Daniel Lerner has argued, ‘Propagandists do not 
decide to tell the truth because they personally are honest, any 
more than they decide to tell lies because they are dishonest’ 
(quoted in Taylor 1997:158). Their choice of wording, debating-
techniques and arguments is entirely a question of strategy.  
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Euphemisms for propaganda 
 
The credibility of the speaker and the audience’s attitude towards 
the message are influenced negatively if a message is 
categorized as propaganda, so most people are averse to being 
branded as propagandists. Consequently, more desirable labels 
are constructed by those who in fact produce propaganda. It is 
normally very poor propaganda if the source itself acknowledges 
that it is in fact disseminating propaganda.   
In recent decades, ‘spin’ has become a common term in 
civil society, especially in politics. Spin involves manipulation 
of political information and is frequently applied by political 
figures and parties. Spin has to do with ‘selling’ politics. It 
operates in the grey zone between rhetoric and propaganda, and 
is widely accepted as a tool that all ‘image-builders’ must apply. 
Jowett & O’Donnell (1999:3) define spin as follows:  
 
Spin is a coordinated strategy to minimize negative information 
and present in a favourable light a story that is damaging. 
 
The term ‘spin doctor’ refers to communication experts 
and advisors who specialize in ‘spinning’ information about their 
clients. The intrusion of public relations into politics means that 
governing now includes conducting a permanent campaign 
(Blumenthal 1980:7). The logic and intensity of election 
campaigns and offensive marketing has made perception 
management compulsory for politicians. Here Blumenthal’s 
words should be borne in mind: ‘Perceptions are not unreal 
simply because they are manufactured’ (ibid: 5). To the 
perceiver, perceptions that are untrue are just as real as true ones. 
Perception management is, for all practical purposes, politics for 
real. 
A government also needs to take care of its image abroad. 
Public diplomacy (PD) is, broadly speaking, ‘the task of 
communicating with overseas publics’ (Leonard 2002:48). 
Leonard, who has done extensive research on PD, argues: 
‘Public diplomacy is not simply delivering a message to an 
audience; it is about getting a result’ (ibid: 52). This suggests 
that PD, much like propaganda, is instrumental and strategic, and 
that the communication works systematically towards a specified 
goal set prior to the communication process. 
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The label PD is thought to have evolved in the circles 
around the public diplomacy centre of the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, established in 1965. 
Manheim (1994: 3–4) distinguishes PD from other forms of 
diplomacy. PD concerns government-to-people contacts, and 
these are different from the more traditional government-to-
government, diplomat-to-diplomat and people-to-people 
contacts. Manheim (1994: 5) offers a fruitful definition of PD: 
 
Public Diplomacy is a government’s process of communicating 
with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding 
for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as 
well as its national goals and current policies. 
 
Although most PD can be labelled as white propaganda, 
there are elements that distinguish it from propaganda. The most 
striking example is the call for ‘developing lasting relationships 
with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, 
seminars, conferences, and access to media channels’ (Leonard 
2002: 51). The Fulbright exchange programme is a good 
example of PD that is not propaganda as such. It is fair to 
acknowledge that such ties between opinion leaders and 
government officials can cut both ways. Propaganda is applied to 
direct behaviour, so when there is real doubt as to who is 
directing whose behaviour, we are not dealing with propaganda 
as defined here. It should be noted that PD sometimes truly 
works towards fostering shared views and common 
understanding.  
The communication situation of PD often differs from 
that of propaganda. Propaganda is here understood as one-way, 
push-down mass communication. Whereas propaganda does not 
encourage discussion, public diplomacy is not a one-way street 
(Cull et al. 2003:327). One way of viewing PD is to relate it to 
Joseph Nye’s idea of soft power: ‘Soft Power is the ability to 
achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through 
attraction rather than coercion’ (Nye 1996:21). If states can 
achieve their goals through public diplomacy rather than through 
coercion, this will be an instance of exercising soft power. Such 
avoidance of disruptive confrontations recalls the military dogma 
observed by Sun Tzu in the 5th century BC: ‘Supreme excellence 
consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ 
(Sun Tzu 1963:48). 
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Figure II illustrates the relationship between public 
diplomacy and white, grey and black propaganda:   
 
Figure II: 
 
 
White propaganda     Public Diplomacy 
 
 
 
Grey propaganda 
 
 
Black propaganda 
 
 
 
 
From Figure II we see that PD and propaganda overlap, 
but that there are also elements of PD that are not propaganda. 
Moreover, almost all PD that can also be defined as propaganda 
belongs in the category of white propaganda, and never in the 
category of black propaganda. 
Propaganda in the war on terrorism 
 
Having established a definition of propaganda, and indicated 
some major differences between propaganda and its synonyms 
and euphemisms, let us look at some empirical examples from 
international politics where these definitions and distinctions 
matter. The war on terrorism is taking place at the centre stage of 
international politics, with ramifications to practically all other 
fields of international politics. After the events of 9/11, 
propaganda became a major feature of the ‘war on terrorism’ 
(Cull et al. 2003: xx). 
Once an actor has decided to launch a propaganda 
campaign, a propaganda strategy is required. A ‘strategy’ is here 
understood as a plan for achieving a certain goal. A propaganda 
strategy will have certain linguistic or argumentative 
characteristics, and will tend to rely on one or more propaganda 
devices – sub-units that make up propaganda strategies. A 
propaganda device is defined as an argument structure – or style 
– that exceeds the limits of rhetoric. 
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The approach chosen here is quote-based. One must be 
able to demonstrate that something is propaganda by pointing 
out credible textual evidence for such a claim: it is not sufficient 
merely to say that this speech or that paragraph is of a 
propagandistic nature. Three empirical examples of propaganda 
strategies will be presented below. These three strategies were 
designed to direct people’s behaviour, because they were all 
adopted in order to generate public support for the war on 
terrorism. The first strategy intended to quell any debate about 
the war on terrorism. The second tried to spread the perception 
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) The 
third was an attempt to link together the first phase (Afghanistan) 
with the second phase (Iraq) of the war on terrorism.  
Quelling discussion in the war on terrorism 
 
With one quote from each of the Bush administration’s (2001–
05) five top members it will be suggested that propaganda – and 
not rhetoric – is the correct categorization for considerable parts 
of the Bush administration’s strategic communication. The five 
quotes from the war on terrorism also illustrate the second 
propaganda strategy examined in this article, which deals with 
unfounded certainty about Iraqi possession of WMD. 
Let us start off with an assessment of the context in which 
the five quotes appeared. George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald 
Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and John Ashcroft are key principals in 
an administration that was attacked on 11 September 2001. They 
perceive themselves to be at war with al Qaeda and international 
terrorism. We should recall that under such circumstances the 
use of propaganda is quite conventional. 
Quote 1 is Ashcroft in December 2001, a period when the 
Bush administration could go far in forcefully choking dissident 
voices. Opposition to the administration’s policies was almost to 
non-existent in mainstream media outlets. Quotes 2 (Cheney) 
and 3 (Rumsfeld) are from the autumn of 2002. At that point the 
Bush administration had made the case for opening a new front 
in the war on terrorism in Iraq. Quote 4 is from Colin Powell’s 
speech on Iraq’s possession of WMD to the UN Security 
Council, February 2003 – a speech he would later describe as a 
blot on his professional record. Finally, quote 5 is from President 
Bush’s ‘ultimatum speech’ on 17 March 2003, in which he gave 
Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq. And indeed, the 
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bombing campaign of Iraq started on 19 March. The five quotes 
appear in chronological order below. 
 
1. To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost 
liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists – for 
they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give 
ammunition to America’s enemies (Ashcroft, 6 December 2001). 
 
2. Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has 
weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing 
them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us 
(Cheney, 26 August 2002). 
 
3. There’s no debate in the world as to whether they have those 
weapons. There’s no debate in the world as to whether they're 
continuing to develop and acquire them [...] We all know that. A 
trained ape knows that. All you have to do is read the newspaper. 
(Rumsfeld, 13 September 2002). 
 
4. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological 
weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. 
[…] We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his 
weapons of mass destruction; he’s determined to make more 
(Powell, 5 February 2003). 
 
5. Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no 
doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some 
of the most lethal weapons ever devised. (Bush, 17 March 2003) 
 
Quote 1 differs slightly from the others. It is an example 
of the kind of condemnation and verbal attacks heaped on those 
who criticized the Bush administration in 2001. Such blatant 
discussion-termination was not sustainable for very long. 
Dissident voices ultimately came to the surface, and the aura of 
ostensible political conformity following 9/11 could not last. 
Some four years later, sentiment in the USA was completely 
different when hurricane Katrina ravaged Louisiana: 
 
The critical difference between the hurricane and the Sept. 11 attacks: Democrats 
appear to be able to question the administration’s competence without opening 
themselves to attacks on their patriotism (Nagourney & Hulse 2005). 
 
When ethnocentric patriotism bordering on nationalism is 
on the rise, critical thinking, diversity and genuine freedom of 
expression are often eclipsed. The shocking events of 9/11 led 
Americans into government-true obedience. The momentum and 
leverage that this loyal attitude gave the Bush administration was 
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solidified through propaganda strategies. As notions of national 
unity and patriotism diminished, so did the Bush 
administration’s room for manoeuvre. 
A core feature of all five statements is that they are 
designed to terminate discussion – note the phrase ‘no doubt’, 
employed by Bush, Powell and Cheney. As the story unfolded, 
there were in fact substantial grounds for having doubts about 
the assessments of WMD in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Bush 
administration sought to dismiss any such claims by short-
circuiting the debate. Rumsfeld went so far as to claim that there 
was not even any debate about these matters, even indicating that 
those who differed with him were below the level of trained 
apes.  
Rumsfeld later claimed that he knew where the WMD 
were stored: ‘We know where they are. They're in the area 
around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north 
somewhat’ (Rumsfeld, 30 March 2003). That statement was a 
plain lie. The fact that the information presented in quotes was 
incorrect, misleading and false leads to the conclusion that they 
properly belong to the category grey propaganda as defined 
above.  
At times it seemed that the Bush administration was 
trying to generate support for a war to disarm Iraq in any way 
possible. In that process they adopted a classic propaganda 
device called ‘the fallacy of impossible certainty’. This involves 
‘stating as fact what cannot possibly be known to be 
true’ (Sandor 2001:135). Did the Bush administration 
deliberately mislead and lie? Not necessarily, and at least not all 
the time. What its members did do was to express unfounded 
certainty about the existence of WMD in Iraq. They did not 
know, but still claimed they knew.  
These two propaganda strategies proved quite effective on 
Americans and the US mass media. The highly reputed 
Washington Post completely accepted the perception that Iraq 
had WMD, and echoed the Bush administration’s call for war in 
an editorial titled ‘Irrefutable’, printed the day after Powell’s UN 
presentation. The impact of the discussion termination is 
obvious, since the Washington Post wrote: ‘it is hard to imagine 
how anyone could doubt that Iraq possesses weapons of mass 
destruction’ (Solomon 2005:46). It was a telling example of 
honest journalism – and effective strategic communication – 
when Washington Post journalist Mary McGrory the same day 
confessed about Powell’s speech: ‘He persuaded me’ (ibid).  
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From Afghanistan to Iraq 
 
The five statements presented above date from different phases 
of the war on terrorism. An important propaganda strategy in the 
war on terrorism aimed to link these different phases together. 
For such purposes, the propaganda device called transfer is 
particularly useful. It involves transferring the attributions and/or 
connotations of one phenomenon onto another phenomenon. To 
qualify as propaganda, the link established must be of a dubious 
kind. This dubious connection can be established to promote 
both benign and atrocious purposes.  
 The application of transfer was crucial in placing the war 
in Iraq firmly under the heading of war on terrorism. ‘Simply by 
mentioning Iraq and Al Qaeda together in the same sentence, 
over and over, the message got through’ (Rampton & Stauber 
2003:96). Here are some statements that contributed to this 
comprehensive transfer by linking together al-Qaeda, Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq: 
 
He [Saddam] is a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. (Bush, 7 November 
2002)  
 
We know that he [Saddam] has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist 
groups, including the al-Qaeda organization. (Cheney, 16 March 2003) 
 
[Iraq] has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al 
Qaeda. (Bush, 17 March 2003) 
 
As we fight the war on terror in Iraq and on other fronts... (Bush, 2 June 2004) 
 
The Bush administration tried to ‘contaminate’ Iraq with 
the established negative representations of al Qaeda and the 
Taliban. ‘The aim was not to prove an assertion but to conflate 
Iraq with al Qaeda any way possible’ (Corn 2003: 218). Table 1 
shows the entities involved in the quite transfer applied: 
 
Table 1:  
 
First phase          Second phase 
War on terrorism  
Osama bin Laden  
Afghanistan 
Taliban 
al Qaeda, terrorism 
Response to attack 
War in Iraq  
Saddam Hussein  
Iraq 
Baath Party 
Iraq as a terrorizing state 
Pre-emptive (preventive) warfare 
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The propaganda of the initial stages of the war on 
terrorism had successfully singled out everything in the left 
column as legitimate targets or courses of action. There had been 
only minor criticism, within the USA and abroad, of the war in 
Afghanistan. It was imperative for the Bush administration that 
the new adversary should receive a similar status, so repetitive 
use of transfers was a natural choice of propaganda device. This 
approach is very much in accordance with the tenets of schema 
theory. Selling the war in Iraq could be facilitated by the existing 
schemata represented by the left-hand column of Table 1.  
The attempt to link these separate phenomena was 
systematic, yet only partly successful. Many people, especially 
outside the USA, started to question whether Iraq was in fact a 
part of the war on terrorism. Was there really any terrorism to 
worry about from Iraq? Former ‘terrorism Czar’ Richard Clarke 
(2004a:231) provides a pre-9/11 quote from deputy CIA Director 
McLaughlin: ‘We have no evidence of any active Iraqi terrorist 
threat against the US.’ Clarke also detected the transfer going on 
while it was still highly operative. In an Op-ed titled ‘The Wrong 
Debate on Terrorism’ in the New York Times he effectively 
dismantled the transfer by a careful choice of words: ‘The war 
on terrorism and the separate war in Iraq’ (Clarke 2004b) 
Conclusions 
 
We have compared and contrasted different variants of strategic 
political communication to propaganda. The definition of 
propaganda used here has emphasized that propaganda, unlike 
rhetoric, is by nature hostile to discussion. A propagandist has no 
interest in adjusting his views or suggested actions to 
accommodate the views and needs of others. By contrast, 
rhetoric has the potential for such deliberative exchanges – but 
this is a potential. Rhetoric need not always have such 
dimensions, and rhetoric and propaganda overlap to some extent.  
Propaganda is best understood as a technique, but it is 
most easily recognizable when its content represents deception 
or disinformation. Between propagandist and propagandee there 
is most often an asymmetry of interest, but this aspect should be 
kept out of a definition of propaganda.  
Specifying that propaganda is a form of mass 
communication is more fruitful as an academic approach. 
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Communication is here defined as social interaction through 
messages, and politics without communication is unthinkable. 
Consequently, heavy reliance on communication experts and 
spin-doctors is unavoidable for politicians. This is all part of 
what has become the permanent campaign of governing. 
Propaganda is a diverse phenomenon, which may well 
admit of further categorization and specification. A typology that 
distinguishes between white, grey and black propaganda is one 
way of doing that. Relating those categories to public diplomacy, 
we see that the similarities between public diplomacy and white 
propaganda are great. However, it would be imprecise to brand 
all PD as propaganda, as it is not necessarily a one-way, push-
down form of mass communication (Peterson 2002:81). 
Key members of the Bush administration sought to 
generate support for the war in Iraq through quashing debates 
about it. They spread the perception that Iraq possessed WMD. 
They expressed unfounded certainty on the WMD-issue. This 
propaganda strategy backfired on the administration when their 
bluff – rather than a large stock of WMD – was exposed in Iraq. 
Transfer was the primary propaganda device employed 
for linking together different phases of the war on terrorism. 
Attempts were made to capitalize on the substantial public 
support for the war in Afghanistan in order to generate support 
for war against Iraq. However, the links between the two wars 
were not as obvious as the Bush administration claimed. Judith 
Yaphe, a CIA analyst for 20 years, put it aptly: ‘You’re left to 
just hear the nouns, and put them together’ (Corn 2003:234).  
In the early stages, it was very hard to voice opposition to 
the war on terrorism. Then, as the costly war in Iraq unfolded, 
and the administration’s propaganda strategies were increasingly 
exposed, critical voices gained momentum in the United States. 
By November 2005 also Dick Cheney had to acknowledge that 
there was indeed debate about important aspects of the war on 
terrorism. Whether his comments are a necessary rhetorical 
manoeuvre forced by pressure and criticism, or an indication of a 
more deliberative stance on attitudes to the war on terrorism 
remains unknown. Cheney’s recent talk at the think-tank 
American Enterprise Institute does, however, represent a shift in 
the strategic communication of the Bush administration: 
 
I do not believe it is wrong to criticize the war on terror or any aspect thereof. 
Disagreement, argument, and debate are the essence of democracy, and none of 
us should want it any other way (Cheney, 21 November 2005). 
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